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FROM THIRD PARTIES TO PARENTS: 
THE CASE OF LESBIAN COUPLES AND 
THEIR CHILDREN 
NANCY D. POLIKOFF* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
In his groundbreaking 1975 article, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial 
Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy,1 Robert Mnookin identified as the first 
issue dominating academic discussion of child-custody law determining “how 
much weight should be given to the interests of the natural parents in custody 
disputes involving third parties.”2 He did not define either “natural parent” or 
“third party,” presumably because he found the meaning of those terms self-
evident; a natural parent was a biological parent and a third party was anyone 
else.3 Two years earlier, the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) had defined the 
parent and child relationship as “the legal relationship existing between a child 
and his natural or adoptive parents.”4 The 1973 UPA also lacked a definition of 
“natural,” but its usage throughout left little doubt that the drafters assumed 
such a person was a child’s biological parent.5 There was no reason for Mnookin 
to think the phrase lacked clarity or needed explication. 
Instead, the term that captured much attention at the time, and that was 
necessary to the core of Mnookin’s analysis, was the term “psychological 
parent.” This term also dated to 1973, when it had been unveiled by Joseph 
Goldstein, Anna Freud, and Albert Solnit in their paradigm-shifting book, 
Beyond the Best Interests of the Child.6 The authors defined psychological 
parent as the person “who, on a continuing, day-to-day basis, through 
interaction, companionship, interplay, and mutuality, fulfills the child’s 
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 1.  39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226 (Summer 1975).  
 2.  Id. at 226.  
 3.  Mnookin did, of course, acknowledge parentage acquired through adoption. “Adoption is the 
legal process by which a child acquires parents other than his natural parents, and parents acquire a 
child other than a natural child. The resulting legal relationship is identical to that of a natural parent 
and child.” Id. at 244 n.85. 
 4.  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 1 (1973), 9B U.L.A. 296 (1987). 
 5.  See, e.g., id. § 3(1) (identifying a natural mother as the woman who gives birth to the child). 
 6.  See generally JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ANNA FREUD & ALBERT J. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST 
INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1973). 
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psychological needs for a parent, as well as the child’s physical needs.”7 
Mnookin accepted the importance of psychological parentage to children.8 
The general rule that a natural parent would prevail over a third party, he 
argued, should give way in a factual situation in which the natural parent was 
not the child’s psychological parent and a third party was.9 Then, the 
psychological parent should prevail in a custody dispute.10 
Legal and cultural developments of the past almost forty years have made 
the template Mnookin developed more complex. Use of assisted reproductive 
technologies has separated genetics from parentage to a degree Mnookin could 
not have predicted. The vast increase in the number of children born to 
unmarried heterosexual couples has also complicated efforts to define 
parentage.11 Mnookin’s model assumed a sharp and easily discernible line 
between parents and third parties. That line is no longer sharp. 
In this article I focus on disputes arising in one illustrative context. A lesbian 
couple decides to bring a child into their relationship and to raise that child 
together, with each of them acting as a parent. They have two options. They 
may adopt, and, although some states allow a joint adoption by the couple, it is 
common for only one partner to adopt the child. Or they may choose 
insemination of one partner with donor semen. Usually, both partners select the 
known donor or the characteristics of an unknown donor, and both participate 
in the insemination and the prenatal process and birth. Whichever route they 
select, they welcome the child into their family as two parents, and they raise 
the child that way for some period of time. Then the couple separates. The child 
may remain with the biological (or legally adoptive) mother, who permits 
ongoing contact, even joint custody, by her ex-partner for a period of time. 
Then, because the biological mother either cuts off contact completely or 
reduces it dramatically, the nonbiological mother files in court for shared 
custody or expanded visitation rights. 
How do we identify the two parties in this dispute?12 The woman who gave 
birth to the child is undeniably the child’s “natural parent.” In the earliest 
disputes, courts identified the woman who did not bear the child as a third 
party.13 She was, of course, a psychological parent, and over a decade into the 
use of that term, advocates argued for her importance in the child’s life.14 But 
 
 7.  Id. at 98. 
 8.  Mnookin, supra note 1, at 282.  
 9.  Id. at 282–83. 
 10.  Id.  
 11.  See Stephanie J. Ventura, Changing Patterns of Nonmarital Childbearing in the United States, 
NCHS DATA BRIEF, May 2009, at 1, 1 (illustrating the rising trend of births to unmarried women). 
 12.  If the couple has completed a second-parent adoption, they are both, of course, parents. The 
analysis in this article is therefore unnecessary to resolve disputes over custody or visitation that arise 
when such a couple separates. 
 13.  See, e.g., In re Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 29 (N.Y. 1991) (per curiam) (discussing 
appellant’s visitation and custody options under a third-party legal regime). 
 14.  These advocates often include national lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) rights 
organizations. In In re Alison D., Alison D. was represented by Lamda Legal. In another third party–
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the argument that Mnookin developed for awarding custody to the 
psychological parent depended upon the absence of the natural parent from the 
child’s life.15 That was never the factual scenario in these cases. Nor was there 
customarily a factual basis for arguing that the birth mother was unfit. 
In part II of this article, I first describe the cases Mnookin used to illustrate 
his approach to parent–third party disputes. I then describe the early lesbian-
couple disputes on which this article focuses, demonstrating the challenge they 
presented to the standard Mnookin advocated. In part III, I incorporate the 
constitutional analysis required under the Supreme Court’s ruling in Troxel v. 
Granville,16 a dispute over visitation rights between a mother and her children’s 
paternal grandparents. I describe how the majority of courts that have applied 
the case have found that it is not a barrier to claims by nonbiological mothers. I 
also describe the minority view, which incorrectly sees no difference between 
the grandparents in Troxel and a petitioning nonbiological mother in a lesbian-
couple custody dispute. In part IV, I analyze evolving designations of 
parentage, including the contemporary answer to the question Mnookin did not 
ask: How to define the term “natural parent”? Finally, I conclude that to 
preserve Mnookin’s values of family autonomy and continuous, stable 
relationships, courts must correctly identify who is a child’s parent. 
II 
LESBIAN COUPLES RAISING CHILDREN DEFY THE PARENT–THIRD PARTY 
BINARY 
A. Mnookin’s Third-Party Cases 
At the time of Mnookin’s article, the iconic custody dispute between a 
parent and a third party was Painter v. Bannister.17 It is no surprise, therefore, 
that Mnookin used it to illustrate his analytical framework. Painter v. Bannister 
arose when a father, Harold Painter, sought return of his son, Mark, from the 
child’s maternal grandparents.18 Harold embraced the San Francisco bay–area 
counterculture of the 1960s.19 The grandparents, Dwight and Margaret 
Bannister, were a stable, conventional Iowa farm couple.20 Harold sent Mark to 
live with the Bannisters after Mark’s mother and sister died in a car accident.21 
Nine months later, when Harold sought Mark’s return, the Bannisters refused, 
 
parent case, Nancy S. v. Michele G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212 (Ct. App. 1991), the National Center for 
Lesbian Rights represented the biological mother’s lesbian partner.  
 15.  See Mnookin, supra note 1, at 282 (highlighting the harm that would come to a child if placed 
with a natural parent whom the child viewed as a stranger). 
 16.  530 U.S. 57 (2000). 
 17.  140 N.W.2d 152 (Iowa 1966). 
 18.  Id. at 153.  
 19.  See id. at 154–56 (describing Harold’s lifestyle and general beliefs).  
 20.  Id. at 154. 
 21.  Id. at 153. 
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and Harold turned to the Iowa courts.22 
The trial court ruled for the father, but the Iowa Supreme Court stayed 
execution of that judgment and then reversed, granting custody to the 
Bannisters.23 The opinion is replete with references to the “arty” and 
“unconventional” life Mark would have with his father as contrasted to the 
“stable” and “dependable” life he would have with his Iowa grandparents.24 The 
court found that Mark was not well-adjusted when he came to his grandparents 
and had greatly improved in their care.25 It also credited the opinion of an 
expert witness who said that Mark considered his grandfather to be his father 
figure and that his placement should not be disrupted.26 Although the court gave 
lip service to the presumption in favor of a parent,27 it found the presumption 
could be overcome if returning to the father was “likely to have a seriously 
disrupting and disturbing effect upon the child’s development.”28 
Mnookin had no trouble determining that this ruling was wrong.29 He noted 
that both the father and the grandparents had a “substantial psychological 
relationship to the child.”30 Therefore, under his proposal, the father should 
have prevailed.31 
The only other third party–parent dispute Mnookin used as illustration was 
In re B.G.,32 a case that turned on application of a new California statute 
defining when courts could grant custody to third parties.33 The statute had been 
enacted expressly “to avoid a Painter v. Bannister situation in California,”34 and 
allowed a third-party custody award only when parental custody was found 
“detrimental to the child.”35 The statute specifically did not require that the 
parent be unfit, because its focus was not on the parent but on the issue of 
detriment to the child.36 
In In re B.G., a mother from Czechoslovakia sought return of her two 
children from their California foster parents.37 The children came to California 
with their father, a political refugee who left Czechoslovakia with the children 
 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  See, e.g., id. at 154, 156 (labeling the child’s potential life with his father as “unstable, 
unconventional, arty, Bohemian, and probably intellectually stimulating”). 
 25.  Id. at 156. 
 26.  Id. at 157. 
 27.  See id. at 156 (noting the court’s sympathy for Harold’s situation).  
 28.  Id. 
 29.  See Mnookin, supra note 1, at 283 (showing what should have happened in Painter).   
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  523 P.2d 244 (Cal. 1974) (en banc). 
 33.  Mnookin, supra note 1, at 247. 
 34.  In re B.G., 523 P.2d at 257 (internal citations omitted) (quoting legislative history). 
 35.  Id. (citing legislative history). 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Id. at 246. 
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without their mother’s consent.38 The father eventually moved into his mother 
and stepfather’s home in California, and a few months later he died.39 After 
that, the children, ages five and six, went to live with the Smiths, neighbors who 
had cared for the children while their father was at work.40 The Smiths became 
licensed as foster parents, and the children lived with the Smiths for more than 
two years before their mother’s petition to regain custody was heard in court.41 
The trial court found the mother to be a fit parent but found it in the children’s 
best interests to remain with their foster parents and so awarded them custody.42 
The California Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, noting that 
the trial judge had not made the statutorily mandated finding that an award of 
custody to the mother would be “detrimental to the child,” and, further, that an 
award to the foster parents was “required to serve the best interests of the 
child.”43 The supreme court did conclude that the foster parents were “de facto 
parents,” a term it defined using the Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit definition of a 
psychological parent.44 Mnookin considered this a case in which the foster 
parents should have prevailed because the mother, who had not seen the 
children in three and a half years, was a “psychological stranger” to them.45 
There are numerous factual distinctions between these two cases and the 
lesbian-couple disputes that form the subject of this article. In both cases the 
third parties claimed a deficiency in the parent–child relationship as a basis for 
awarding them custody. The Bannisters claimed to be better able to raise 
Mark;46 the Smiths argued they had replaced the children’s mother.47 Mnookin’s 
opinion about the correct outcome for the two cases depended upon whether 
the third party had supplanted the biological parent as the child’s psychological 
parent. That question elided the definitional inquiry into the meaning of the 
terms “third party” and “parent.” 
B. Lesbian Couples with Children Split Up 
When Mnookin was writing, there were certainly court cases involving 
lesbian mothers. The cases, however, all concerned the placement of children 
born in heterosexual marriages in which the mother had come out as lesbian in 
 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Id. at 247. 
 40.  Id. at 247 & 247 n.3. 
 41.  Id. at 247–48. The mother had made prior efforts to secure the return of the children and had 
not received notice of all the earlier court hearings involving the children’s placement with the Smiths. 
Id. at 248. 
 42.  Id. at 248–49. 
 43.  Id. at 257–58. 
 44.  Id. at 253 n.18, 254 (citing GOLDSTEIN, FREUD & SOLNIT, supra note 6, at 98).  
 45.  Mnookin, supra note 1, at 283.  
 46.  See Painter v. Bannister, 140 N.W.2d 152, 154 (Iowa 1966) (highlighting the ability of the 
Bannister’s to provide a “stable” and “dependable” life, as opposed to the “Bohemian” existence of the 
natural father). 
 47.  In re B.G., 523 P.2d at 254 (noting the Smith’s status as de facto parents). 
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conjunction with the end of her marriage or at a later date.48 In some instances, 
third-party relatives sought custody on the basis of the mother’s lesbianism.49 In 
all of those cases, the lesbian mother was the child’s psychological parent and 
the third-party relatives were not.50 Mnookin’s template would have strongly 
favored the mothers, and it would have been a welcome corrective to courts 
that were often quite willing to disregard the parent–child relationship when the 
parent was a lesbian.51 
Mnookin could not have foreseen the type of custody dispute that would 
arise between a biological mother and a nonbiological mother who had raised a 
child together since infancy; the first known contested case involving such facts 
occurred in 1984.52 The earliest cases need not be examined individually, 
because two prominent early cases illustrate the factual circumstances common 
to all such cases.53 
In Nancy S. v. Michele G., Michele and Nancy had been together for more 
than ten years.54 In 1980, Nancy gave birth to a child, K., who was conceived 
through donor insemination and planned by the couple together. Michele was 
listed on the birth certificate as the father.55 Four years later, Nancy gave birth 
to a son, S. Michele was again listed as the father on the birth certificate.56 Both 
children were given Michele’s family name.57 Both children referred to both 
women as “mom.”58 
When S. was an infant the couple separated and agreed that K. would live 
with Michele and S. would live with Nancy.59 They arranged visitation so that 
the children were together four days a week in one parent’s home. Three years 
later, Nancy wanted to change the schedule so that each parent would have 
both children fifty percent of the time. Michele disagreed. 
 
 
 48.  See generally Nan D. Hunter & Nancy D. Polikoff, Custody Rights of Lesbian Mothers: Legal 
Theory and Litigation Strategy, 25 BUFF. L. REV. 691 (1976) (discussing a number of these cases). 
 49.  See Chaffin v. Frye, 119 Cal. Rptr. 22, 23 (Ct. App. 1975); Bennett v. Clemens, 196 S.E.2d 842, 
843 (Ga. 1973); Spence v. Durham, 198 S.E.2d 537, 541 (N.C. 1973); Commonwealth ex rel. Ashfield v. 
Cortes, 234 A.2d 47, 48 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1967). See generally Hunter & Polikoff, supra note 48, at 705–11.  
 50.  Chaffin, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 23; Bennett, 196 S.E.2d at 843; Spence, 198 S.E.2d at 542; 
Commonwealth ex rel. Ashfield, 234 A.2d at 48. See generally Hunter & Polikoff, supra note 48, at 705–
711. 
 51.  Mnookin, supra note 1, at 282–83. 
 52.  See Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the 
Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459, 533–34 
(1990) (recognizing a California case, Loftin v. Flournoy, No. 569630-7 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 2, 1985), as 
the first of this kind)  
 53.  Nancy S. v. Michele G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212, 214 (Ct. App. 1991); Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 
N.E.2d 27, 28 (N.Y. 1991) (per curiam). 
 54.  Nancy S., 279 Cal. Rptr. at 214.  
 55.  Id.  
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  Id. 
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At that point, Nancy filed a petition alleging that she was the sole parent of 
both children and requesting sole legal and physical custody.60 Michele 
responded by alleging that she, too, was a parent of the children. The trial court 
ruled for Nancy, and the appeals court affirmed based on the fact that Michele 
was not the children’s “natural” or adoptive mother, citing the state’s version of 
the UPA.61 
Michele agreed that she was not the children’s natural mother, but she 
alleged that the UPA was not the exclusive method of determining parentage.62 
She further alleged that she had the status of de facto parent.63 She specifically 
asserted that she was the children’s psychological parent and that therefore she 
should be able to seek custody and visitation on the same terms as any legally 
recognized parent.64 
Michele also cited In re B.G.,65 one of the two cases Mnookin had used to 
demonstrate his principle about psychological parentage.66 That case relied on 
the concept of de facto parent, but the court in Nancy S. noted that even if 
Michele proved she was a de facto parent, she could not obtain custody without 
showing that custody in Nancy would be detrimental to the children.67 This was 
a fact Michele did not allege and could not have proven. The court also rejected 
in loco parentis, equitable estoppel, and a definition of functional parenthood as 
bases for awarding custody to Michele.68 In the end, the court deemed the 
situation facing K. and S. “tragic,” but it rejected every argument Michele 
proffered, preferring to leave any solution in the hands of the legislature.69 
Simultaneously, on the other side of the country, the case of In re Alison D. 
v. Virginia M.70 was developing the same way. Alison and Virginia had been 
living together for more than three years when Virginia gave birth to a child. 
The couple had planned for the child together, and it was conceived through 
donor insemination.71 Alison’s last name became the child’s middle name.72 The 
couple split up when the child was almost two and a half years old, but for 
almost three more years Alison had regular visitation with the child, until 
Virginia terminated contact when the child was six.73 Alison petitioned for 
visitation.74 
 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  Id. at 214–15, 219. 
 62.  Id. at 215. 
 63.  Id. at 216. 
 64.  Id. at 215–16. 
 65.  Id. at 216. 
 66.  See Mnookin, supra note 1, at 283. 
 67.  Nancy S., 279 Cal. Rptr. at 215–16. 
 68.  See id. at 217–19 (precluding a parental determination under each of these theories). 
 69.  Id. at 219. 
 70.  572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991) (per curiam). 
 71.  Id. at 28. 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Id. at 28–29. 
 74.  Id. at 29. 
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New York had not adopted the UPA.75 Its statute permitted “parents” to 
initiate claims for custody and visitation.76 With “parent” undefined in the 
statute, Alison argued that as a de facto parent or a parent by estoppel she 
should have standing to pursue her claim.77 In a per curiam opinion, the New 
York Court of Appeals rejected her arguments, citing Nancy S. v. Michele G. in 
support of their ruling.78 
In both cases, advocates for Michele and Alison argued the theory of 
psychological parentage that had animated Mnookin in his article. In this 
context, however, the child did have another psychological parent who was also 
what Mnookin would have called a “natural parent.”79 It appears that in such 
circumstances, Mnookin would have favored granting custody to the “natural 
parent.”80 
C. The Visitation-Rights Breakthrough and Its Later Impact on Custody 
Disputes 
The breakthrough case for nonbiological mothers in these families occurred 
in Wisconsin in 1995.81 The facts of In re custody of H.S.H.-K. were familiar 
enough. Sandra Holtzman and Elsbeth Knott met in 1983, and in 1984 they 
“solemnized their commitment to each other.”82 They decided to have a child 
together through insemination with an anonymous donor, and in 1988 Knott 
gave birth to a child.83 Holtzman was present and took three weeks off from 
work. The couple named the child together, and both women were named as 
the child’s parents at a church ceremony.84 Holtzman’s parents were recognized 
as the child’s grandparents.85 The couple raised the child as two parents.86 In 
1993, Knott moved out with the child, and the next year she terminated all 
 
 75.  See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 70 (McKinney 2010).  
 76.  Id.; see also Alison D., 572 N.E.2d at 29. 
 77.  Alison D., 572 N.E.2d at 29. 
 78.  Id. (citing Nancy S. v. Michele G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212 (Ct. App. 1991)).   
 79.  See, e.g., Mnookin, supra note 1, at 226 (noting the use of the best-interests standard to reject 
certain claims by a natural parent).  
 80.  See id. at 282–83 (“[N]atural parents should be preferred over others.”). Alison was seeking 
only visitation rights and Michele would have preferred visitation rights to complete exclusion from her 
children’s lives. Nancy S., 279 Cal. Rptr. at 214; Alison D., 572 N.E.2d at 28. Mnookin was silent on 
visitation rights for a psychological parent. See generally Mnookin, supra note 1. In fact, he did not 
discuss visitation rights at all in the article. Perhaps the most controversial recommendation made by 
Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit, and one never adopted into law, was that a child be accorded one 
omnipotent parent who would even have the power to deny the other parent visitation rights with the 
child. GOLDSTEIN, FREUD & SOLNIT, supra note 6, at 38. Given the importance of Goldstein, Freud, 
and Solnit’s theories to Mnookin’s article, it would have been hard for him to discuss visitation without 
addressing that recommendation.  
 81.  In re Custody of H.S.H-K., 533 N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 1995). 
 82.  Id. at 421. 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  Id. at 421–22. 
 85.  Id. at 422. 
 86.  Id. 
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contact between the child and Holtzman. Holtzman petitioned for custody and 
visitation. 
The court developed a four-part test for evaluating a claim by a person in 
Holtzman’s situation that she was entitled to a continued relationship with a 
child.87 In addition, it permitted a person meeting this test to bring a court 
action only when two triggering circumstances existed. The four-prong test was 
(1) that the biological or adoptive parent consented to, and fostered, the petitioner’s 
formation and establishment of a parent-like relationship with the child; (2) that the 
petitioner and the child lived together in the same household; (3) that the petitioner 
assumed obligations of parenthood by taking significant responsibility for the child’s 
care, education and development, including contributing towards the child’s support, 
without expectation of financial compensation; and (4) that the petitioner has been in 
a parental role for a length of time sufficient to have established with the child a 
bonded, dependent relationship parental in nature.
88
 
The triggering circumstances that would allow the individual to bring a court 
action were “that this parent has interfered substantially with the petitioner’s 
parent-like relationship with the child, and that the petitioner sought court 
ordered visitation within a reasonable time after the parent’s interference.”89 
Advocates for lesbian and gay families greeted H.S.H.-K. with acclaim and 
relief, but the case was not a clear victory. By meeting all the established 
criteria, a woman would be able to maintain a relationship with the child she 
had planned for and raised, but only through visitation.90 She was still a third 
party.91 She was simply in a class of third parties entitled to visitation rights.92 
Still, after the total defeat in Nancy S. and Alison D., visitation rights looked 
good indeed.93 
The H.S.H-.K. criteria had a significant impact on subsequent cases. In 2000, 
in V.C. v. M.J.B., the New Jersey Supreme Court adopted the test and went 
farther than Wisconsin in establishing the consequences of meeting all the 
criteria.94 A person meeting such criteria would stand in parity to a legal parent 
for determinations of custody and visitation.95 Five years later, in In re 
 
 87.  Id. at 421. 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  See id. at 424 (affirming summary judgment on the custody issue). 
 91.  Id. at 430 (discussing visitation of a third party).  
 92.  See id. at 436 (remanding the determination of Holtzman’s parent-like relationship with the 
child). 
 93.  See Nancy S. v. Michele G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212, 215 (Ct. App. 1991); In re Alison D. v. Virginia 
M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 29 (N.Y. 1991) (per curiam).   
 94.  748 A.2d 539, 551–52 (N.J. 2000) (per curiam).  
 95.  Id. at 554. The court did say that if the evidence stood “in equipoise,” custody should be 
awarded to the legal parent because “in the search for self-knowledge, the child's interest in his or her 
roots will emerge.” Id. This peculiar reasoning has not made its way into subsequent decisions, perhaps 
because the evidence of a child’s best interests is rarely in equipoise. (The reasoning is peculiar because 
if the legal parent is an adoptive rather than a biological parent there is no difference between the 
parents when it comes to the child’s “roots.” In addition, even when the legal parent is a biological 
parent, that parent will receive visitation rights that should be sufficient to satisfy the child’s speculative 
desire to connect to hir or her to biological roots.) 
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Parentage of L.B.,96 Washington adopted the H.S.H.-K. test as a common-law 
method of determining parentage.97 The court deemed such a person a de facto 
parent and also found that such a person stood “in legal parity” to someone 
declared a parent under the state’s version of the UPA.98 
III 
THE IMPACT OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
A. The Supreme Court Speaks: Troxel v. Granville 
A reader of Mnookin’s 1975 article cannot help but be struck by its omission 
of constitutional doctrine.99 In the analyses of disputes between parents and 
third parties, Mnookin did prefer parents, but without declaring such a rule 
constitutionally mandated.100 The biological mothers in H.S.H.-K, V.C., and 
L.B. all petitioned for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court, requesting reversal 
of state courts’ rulings on the ground that those rulings violated a parent’s right 
to raise her child.101 The Court denied the petitions.102 While V.C.’s petition was 
pending, however, the Supreme Court did address the rights of parents when 
challenged by third parties in Troxel v. Granville,103 a case that has shaped all 
subsequent disputes. 
By now, the facts of Troxel are well-known. After Brad Troxel, father of two 
daughters, took his own life, Brad’s parents objected to the minimal visitation 
the children’s mother, Tommie Granville, wished to accord them.104 They sued 
for more frequent contact with the children under a Washington statute that 
allowed “any person” at “any time” to petition for visitation rights and obtain 
such rights under a best-interests standard.105 The trial court awarded the 
Troxels one weekend a month with the children and one week in the summer.106 
The court reasoned that the contact would allow the children to benefit from 
“cousins and music.”107 The judge also expounded from the bench that he had 
 
 96.  122 P.3d 161 (Wash. 2005) (en banc). 
 97.  See id. at 165, 176.  
 98.  Id. at 177. The court ruled that the state’s version of the UPA was not the only way to 
determine parentage. Id. In other words, the Washington Supreme Court adopted the very reasoning 
argued by Michele G. in California: that the UPA was not an exclusive method of proving parentage. 
See supra text accompanying notes 62–64.  
 99.  See generally Mnookin, supra note 1.  
 100.  See id. at 282–83. 
 101.  M.J.B. v. V.C., 748 A.2d 539 (N.J. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 926 (2000); In re Parentage of 
L.B., 122 P.3d 161, cert denied sub nom. Britain v. Carvin, 547 U.S. 1143 (2006); In re Custody of 
H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 1995), cert. denied sub nom. Knott v. Holtzman, 516 U.S. 975 (1995). 
 102.  See sources cited supra note 101.  
 103.  530 U.S. 57 (2000) (plurality opinion). 
 104.  Id. at 60–61. 
 105.  Id. at 61 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 26.10.160 (2005)). 
 106.  Id. The court also awarded four hours of visitation on each grandparent’s birthday. Id.  
 107.  Id. at 62.  
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greatly enjoyed spending summers as a child with his own grandparents.108 
The Washington Supreme Court, on appeal, found the statute 
unconstitutional on its face.109 The court held that a third party could not receive 
visitation rights over the objection of a fit parent absent evidence that the 
children would be harmed by a denial of visitation.110 The Troxels petitioned the 
U.S. Supreme Court, which agreed to hear the case.111 
No majority opinion emerged in the case. A plurality agreed that the statute 
was unconstitutional as applied to Tommie Granville, but declined to affirm the 
Washington Supreme Court’s two-part holding, on grounds that either the 
statute was unconstitutional on its face or that harm was necessary before a 
third party could be granted visitation rights over a fit parent’s objection.112 
Instead, the Court criticized the “breathtakingly broad” nature of the statute 
because it allowed anyone at any time to file for visitation and allowed a trial 
judge to order such visitation upon satisfaction of a mere best-interests 
standard, a standard that allowed a judge to inappropriately substitute his or 
her opinion for that of the child’s parent.113 The Washington statute, the 
plurality ruled, allowed the decision of a fit parent to be overruled without 
giving “special weight” to that decision and without the presence of “special 
factors” that might justify such an intrusion into a parent’s due-process liberty 
interest in raising his or her child.114 
The six-person majority for affirming the judgment of the Washington 
Supreme Court included Justice Thomas, who believed the statute failed strict 
scrutiny,115 and Justice Souter, who thought the best approach was affirming the 
state court’s holding of facial unconstitutionality and leaving it to the 
Washington legislature to craft a better statute.116 
Justices Stevens and Kennedy wrote separate dissents. Justice Stevens 
acknowledged that parents have a fundamental liberty interest in “caring for 
and guiding their children,”117 and noted that “the presumption that parental 
decisions generally serve the best interests of their children is sound.”118 He 
nonetheless focused on separate rights that a child might have, noting that even 
 
 108.  See id. at 72 (“I look back on some personal experiences . . . . We always spen[t] as kids a week 
with one set of grandparents and another set of grandparents, [and] it happened to work out in our 
family that [it] turned out to be an enjoyable experience. Maybe that can, in this family, if that is how it 
works out.”) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 109.  Id. at 63. 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  In re Custody of Smith, 969 P.2d 21 (Wash. 1998), cert. granted, 527 U.S. 1069 (1999). 
 112.  Troxel, 530 U.S. at 73. 
 113.  Id. at 67. 
 114.  Id.at 68–69. 
 115.  Id. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 116.  See id. at 76, 79 (Souter, J., concurring) (“I do not question the power of a State’s highest court 
to construe its domestic statute and to apply a demanding standard when ruling on its facial 
constitutionality.”).  
 117.  Id. at 87 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 118.  Id. at 86.   
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a fit parent might treat a child as a “mere possession,”119 and invoking Court 
precedent to reject the suggestion that parental rights might turn children into 
“so much chattel.”120 
Justice Stevens rejected the Washington Supreme Court’s holding that the 
statute, because it failed to require harm to the child before visitation could be 
granted over a parent’s objection, was unconstitutional on its face.121 He 
reasoned that 
[u]nder the Washington statute, there are plainly any number of cases—indeed, one 
suspects, the most common to arise—in which the “person” among “any” seeking 
visitation is a once-custodial caregiver, an intimate relation, or even a genetic parent. 
Even the Court would seem to agree that in many circumstances, it would be 
constitutionally permissible for a court to award some visitation of a child to a parent 
or previous caregiver in cases of parental separation or divorce, cases of disputed 
custody, cases involving temporary foster care or guardianship, and so forth.
122
 
He also articulated a “child’s liberty interests in preserving established familial 
or family-like bonds,”123 and he referred to “[t]he almost infinite variety of 
family relationships that pervade our ever-changing society” as a reason not to 
treat a parent’s liberty interest as something that could be “exercised 
arbitrarily.”124 
Justice Kennedy also invoked changing family structures to describe why the 
Washington Supreme Court was wrong, and why a best-interests standard 
would sometimes be constitutionally permissible. “Cases are sure to arise,” he 
wrote, “perhaps a substantial number of cases—in which a third party, by acting 
in a caregiving role over a significant period of time, has developed a 
relationship with a child which is not necessarily subject to absolute parental 
veto.”125 He continued, 
In my view, it would be more appropriate to conclude that the constitutionality of the 
application of the best interests standard depends on more specific factors. In short, a 
fit parent’s right vis-a-vis a complete stranger is one thing; her right vis-a-vis another 
parent or a de facto parent may be another.
126
 
The reasoning of both the Stevens and the Kennedy dissents supports the 
constitutionality of maintaining contact between a child and her nonbiological 
lesbian mother in the scenarios presented in this article. 
In the years since Troxel, state courts have split sharply over the case’s 
application to third-party custody and visitation disputes. In spite of the 
plurality’s explicit rejection of the harm standard, some state courts have held 
third-party visitation statutes unconstitutional in the absence of requiring harm 
 
 119.  Id. 
 120.  Id. at 89. 
 121.  Id. at 85. 
 122.  Id. 
 123.  Id. at 88. 
 124.  Id. 
 125.  Id. at 98 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 126.  Id. at 100. 
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from a denial of visitation.127 And although Troxel held only that the 
Washington statute was unconstitutional as applied to the facts of that case, 
several states subsequently held their third-party visitation statutes to be invalid 
on their face.128 Numerous other state courts, however, have upheld the statutes 
in their respective states.129 Of course, even when a statute is constitutional, its 
application in each case must satisfy a state appellate court’s interpretation of 
Troxel’s mandate. 
B. Lesbian-Couple Custody Disputes After Troxel 
Troxel increased the stakes in determining who qualified as a child’s parent. 
Alison D. and Michele G. argued that they were parents and lost.130 Holtzman 
argued she was a parent and lost that determination, but she was found eligible 
for visitation rights if she met the detailed criteria set out by the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court.131 The Wisconsin standard was far from the “any person at any 
time” standard struck down in Troxel: It incorporated the very “special factors” 
that the Troxel plurality found unmet on the facts of that case.132 When the New 
Jersey Supreme Court used the Wisconsin standard as the basis for finding that 
a nonbiological lesbian mother stood in legal parity with the child’s biological 
mother, it was unsurprising that, shortly after ruling in Troxel, the U.S. Supreme 
Court denied the biological mother’s petition for certiorari.133 
More than a decade after Troxel, most courts have found that the case does 
not bar claims by nonbiological lesbian mothers. In an early case, Rubano v. 
DiCenzo,134 the Rhode Island Supreme Court found that Troxel did not give a 
parent an absolute right to arbitrarily terminate a de facto parental relationship 
that the parent had agreed to and fostered for many years.135 In Bethany v. 
Jones,136 the Arkansas Supreme Court distinguished claimants standing in loco 
parentis to a child, like the lesbian nonbiological mother in that case, from the 
 
 127.  See, e.g., Doe v. Doe, 172 P.3d 1067, 1080 (Haw. 2007) (“[W]e believe that a ‘harm to the child’ 
standard is constitutionally required . . . .”). 
 128. See Sonya C. Garza, The Troxel Aftermath: A Proposed Solution for State Courts and 
Legislatures, 69 LA. L. REV 927, 940–41 n.101 (2009) (listing numerous cases holding their 
corresponding states’ visitation statutes facially unconstitutional).   
 129.  See Garza, supra note 128, at 940 n.100.  
 130.  See Nancy S. v. Michele G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212, 216, 219 (Ct. App. 1991); In re Alison D. v. 
Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 28 (N.Y. 1991) (per curiam) (“[A]lthough petitioner apparently nurtured a 
close and loving relationship with the child, she is not a parent . . . .”). 
 131.  In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419, 421 (Wis. 1995) (remanding the determination of 
whether Holtzman’s qualified for visitation). 
 132.  Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 67 (2000) (plurality opinion) (finding no special factors to 
justify the state’s interference with the mother’s fundamental right to raise her children); H.S.H.-K., 533 
N.W.2d at 421. 
 133.  See V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 554 (N.J. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 926 (2000) (denying 
certiorari four months after the Troxel decision).  
 134.  759 A.2d 959 (R.I. 2000). 
 135.  Id. at 976. For an in-depth discussion of this case see Nancy D. Polikoff, The Impact of Troxel 
v. Granville on Lesbian and Gay Parents, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 825, 835–38 (2001). 
 136.  378 S.W.3d 731 (Ark. 2011). 
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grandparents in Troxel.137 In Kulstad v. Maniaci,138 the Montana Supreme Court 
upheld despite a Troxel-based challenge a statute that allowed a woman who 
was not the legally adoptive parent of the child she and her partner had raised 
together to obtain custody or visitation by showing (1) that she had established 
a child–parent relationship and (2) that the child’s parent had acted contrary to 
her child–parent relationship.139 The supreme courts of both Kentucky and 
North Carolina have held that a parent can waive her superior right to custody 
by acting inconsistently with her paramount parental status and creating 
another parent figure for the child.140 It is worth observing that such holdings 
have come from courts in several states not generally supportive of lesbian, gay, 
bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) families. 
A minority of states, however, have denied a functional psychological parent 
without legal status the ability to request custody or visitation rights. Although 
more often such courts have ruled on state-statutory or common-law grounds, 
some have also cited Troxel as a barrier.141 The Maryland Court of Appeals 
denied a de facto parent the ability to remain in the life of her child, citing 
extensively from Troxel, but leaving the door open for the possibility that the 
legislature might constitutionally amend its custody laws to allow such a person 
to petition for custody or visitation.142 Most significantly, in 2010, in Debra H. v. 
Janice R.,143 the New York Court of Appeals upheld its reasoning in Alison D., 
citing the legislature’s failure to amend its custody statutes in the many years 
since that ruling.144 The court also cited Troxel in support of Janice’s 
fundamental right to raise her child.145 
The New York court reasoned that this constitutional right would be 
threatened by uncertainty if a person could pursue custody or visitation rights 
based on a test for functional parenthood.146 Debra had argued that the 
Wisconsin factors constituted an appropriate method for determining functional 
or de facto parentage.147 The court responded that 
the flexible type of rule championed by [Debra] H. threatens to trap single biological 
and adoptive parents and their children in a limbo of doubt. These parents could not 
possibly know for sure when another adult’s level of involvement in family life might 
reach the tipping point and jeopardize their right to bring up their children without the 
 
 137.  Id. at 736. 
 138.  220 P.3d 595 (Mont. 2009). 
 139.  Id. at 607, 609–10.  
 140.  Mullins v. Picklesimer, 317 S.W.3d 569, 579, 581 (Ky. 2010); Boseman v. Jarrell, 704 S.E.2d 
494, 505, 550–51 (N.C. 2010). 
 141.  For a listing, see Carlos A. Ball, Rendering Children Illegitimate in Former Partner Parenting 
Cases: Hiding Behind the Façade of Certainty, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 623, 624 n.4 
(2012).  
 142.  Janice M. v. Margaret K., 948 A.2d 73, 74, 89 (Md. 2008). 
 143.  930 N.E.2d 184 (N.Y. 2010). 
 144.  Id. at 194 (pointing out that the legislature did not amend N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 70 
(McKinney 2010) after Alison D. was handed down).  
 145.  Id. at 193 (citing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000)). 
 146.  Id.   
 147.  Id. at 192 n.3. 
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unwanted participation of a third party.
148
 
The court also wished to avoid the “contentious, costly, and lengthy” hearings 
that such a rule might produce.149 Instead the court ruled that a nonbiological 
mother is a parent, and she is thereby entitled to custody or visitation only if she 
has adopted the child or if she and the biological mother were married or in a 
civil union at the time of the child’s birth.150 
IV 
THE EVOLVING DEFINITIONS OF PARENT 
A. Assisted Reproduction and Changing Family Structures 
Social changes Mnookin could not have anticipated have led to numerous 
disputes about child custody that have challenged courts to identify the 
relationship between a child and an individual claiming to be, or not to be, that 
child’s parent.151 In this part I look at those changes. I then examine the case law 
and statutory responses to those changes and describe the evolution of the 
meaning of “natural parent,” the term Mnookin and the drafters of the 1973 
UPA found unnecessary to define. 
Most contemporary methods of assisted conception, including surrogacy and 
in vitro fertilization, did not exist in 1975,152 and they increased the number of 
parents not genetically related to their children. Although the 1973 UPA 
established the parentage of a husband who consented to his wife’s 
insemination with donor semen under the supervision of a physician153—
 
 148.  Id. at 193. 
 149.  Id. at 192. For a scathing critique of the New York court’s assumption that the test established 
in H.S.H.-K. produced uncertainty when contrasted with New York’s approach, see Ball, supra note 
141. Although Justice Kennedy’s dissent in Troxel also noted the disruption and cost that contested 
litigation could bring, he nonetheless suggested that a parent might not be able to veto a claim by a 
person who had cared for a child for a substantial period and thereby developed a relationship with the 
child. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 98, 101 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see supra text 
accompanying notes 125–126. 
 150.  Debra H., 930 N.E.2d at 191–92, 195, 197. In a subsequent case, a trial court identified another 
basis on which a nonbiological mother might prevail, ruling that a biological mother who had 
previously obtained a child-support order against her former partner in an action in which she 
identified her ex-partner as a parent of their child could not later invoke Debra H. to block the former 
partner’s petition for custody. Estrelitta A. v. Jennifer D., 963 N.Y.S.2d 843, 847 (Fam. Ct. 2013). For a 
critique of making the parents’ formal relationship status, such as marriage or civil union, the dividing 
line between children with two parents and children with one parent, see Nancy D. Polikoff, The New 
Illegitimacy: Winning Backward in the Protection of the Children of Lesbian Couples, 20 AM. U. J. 
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 721 (2012).  
 151.  See generally Mnookin, supra note 1 (omitting a discussion of a scenario where an individual 
poses as a child’s natural parent). 
 152.  See Lyria Bennett Moses, Understanding Legal Responses to Technological Change: The 
Example of In Vitro Fertilization, 6 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 505, 509 (2005) (dating the birth of the 
“world’s first [in vitro fertilization] baby,” Louise Brown, as July 25, 1978). The first known legal 
agreement between a surrogate mother and intended parents took place in 1976. History of Surrogacy, 
INFO. ON SURROGACY, http://www.information-on-surrogacy.com/history-of-surrogacy.html (last 
visited Apr. 16, 2013).  
 153.  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5(a) (1973), 9B U.L.A. 301 (1987). 
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something that had been unsettled before that time154—it was silent on 
permutations of that practice: insemination with semen from a known donor, 
self-insemination with semen purchased directly from a sperm bank, and 
insemination of an unmarried single woman or an unmarried woman with a 
male or female partner. The 1973 UPA separated genetics from parentage by 
declaring that a donor of semen under the delineated situation was not a 
parent,155 but it did not address the parental status of a donor under any other 
scenario. The possibility of a husband and wife commissioning the birth of a 
child, conceived through sperm and egg from unknown donors, fertilized 
through in vitro fertilization, with the resulting embryo implanted in the uterus 
of yet another woman—and the legal disputes such an arrangement could 
produce156—would have seemed like science fiction in 1975. 
Simultaneously, sexual practices and the composition of American families 
shifted. The percentage of married women engaging in extramarital sex 
increased,157 thereby increasing the chance a mother’s husband was not the 
genetic father of her child. Also, the number of cohabiting heterosexual couples 
skyrocketed.158 Without the marital presumption tying a man to a child born to 
his unmarried female partner, his status was uncertain, especially when she 
conceived through assisted conception or through sexual intercourse with a 
different man. Science also entered the picture by perfecting the ability to 
determine whether a given man or woman was the genetic parent of any 
particular child.159 
Mnookin also could not have imagined the phenomenon of same-sex 
couples raising children, conceived through numerous methods: donor 
insemination of one woman in the female couple, in vitro fertilization of one 
woman’s egg with donor semen followed by implementing into the uterus of the 
 
 154.  See id. § 5 cmt. (“It was thought useful . . . to single out and cover in this Act at least one fact 
situation that occurs frequently.”). For an example of a pre-UPA case finding a child born of artificial 
insemination illegitimate, see Gursky v. Gursky, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963). 
 155.  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5(b) (1973), 9B U.L.A. 301 (1987). 
 156.  See In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 280, 286 (Ct. App. 1998) (discussing the 
implications of such a fact pattern).  
 157.  See Tara Parker-Pope, Love, Sex and the Changing Landscape of Infidelity, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
28, 2008, at D1 (discussing the apparent increase in female infidelity and extramarital affairs). In 2011, 
an Indiana University Kinsey Institute for Research in Sex, Gender, and Reproduction study found an 
increase to nineteen percent of women participating in extramarital affairs. Insight Into Infidelity: Study 
Examines Influence of Sexual Personality Characteristics, IND. U., http://newsinfo.iu.edu/news-
archive/18977.html (last modified June 24, 2011). That number put women almost on par with the 
twenty-three percent of men who were found to engage in extramarital affairs. Id.  
 158.  In 1970, there were 523,000 unmarried heterosexual couples living together. U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS P20-365, MARITAL STATUS AND LIVING 
ARRANGEMENTS 5 tbl.F (1980). By 1977 there were 957,000. Id. In 2012, the number of unmarried 
heterosexual couples living together had jumped to 7,845,000. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICA’S 
FAMILIES AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS: 2012, at 20 tbl.7 (2012), available at http://www.census.gov/ 
prod/2013pubs/p20-570.pdf.  
 159.  See History of Paternity Testing, GENESYS, http://www.paternity-answers.com/history-
paternity-test.html#1980 (last visited Nov. 5, 2013) (recognizing the increase in accuracy of paternity 
testing in the 1970s to 80% and in the 1980s to 99.99%).  
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other woman for gestation and birth, sexual intercourse of one female partner 
with a man—with or without the knowledge and consent of the other female 
partner, or gay male couples using traditional and gestational surrogates. Nor 
could he have contemplated that within two generations 46.44% of the U.S. 
adult population160 and 49.58% of adult gay people161 would live in a state 
offering formal recognition of gay relationships, including the parentage 
presumption flowing from marriage. 
B. Statutes and Court Rulings Adapt to Assisted Reproductive Technologies 
and Changed Family Demographics 
Both courts and legislatures have responded to the social changes described 
above. As discussed in part II, some state courts, through common-law 
adjudication, identified de facto parents and gave such persons an equal claim 
to custody of a child.162 Other states enacted statutes producing the same 
result,163 and the ALI recommended one such approach in the definition of 
 
 160.  To deduce this number I divided the adult population of states that have couple recognition 
(111,561,028) by the total adult population of the United States (240,185,952). See LGBT Populations, 
MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, http://www.lgbtmap.org/equality-maps/lgbt_populations (select 
“State Data Table” tab) (last updated May 15, 2014). Couple-recognition states are those with full 
marriage equality or those with broad relationship-recognition laws. See States, FREEDOM TO MARRY, 
http://www.freedomtomarry.org/states/ (last updated June 17, 2014). 
 161.  To deduce this number I divided the total number of LGBT adults in the couple-recognition 
states (4,196,185) by the total number of LGBT adults in all states (8,463,640). See sources cited supra 
note 160.  
 162.  See supra text accompanying notes 94–98. 
 163.  For example, after the Delaware Supreme Court ruled against a legally unrecognized mother 
because she could not meet the definitions in the state’s UPA, see Smith v. Gordon, 968 A.2d 1, 16 
(Del. 2009), the Delaware legislature amended its UPA. See 77 Del. Laws 282 (2010). A statutory path 
to parentage as a de facto parent is available in Delaware to a person who can show that he or she 
(1) Has had the support and consent of the child's parent or parents who fostered the 
formation and establishment of a parent-like relationship between the child and the de facto 
parent; 
(2) Has exercised parental responsibility for the child as that term is defined in § 1101 of this 
title; and  
(3) Has acted in a parental role for a length of time sufficient to have established a bonded 
and dependent relationship with the child that is parental in nature.  
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201 (2009). In the District of Columbia, a de facto parent is a person  
(A) Who: 
(i) Lived with the child in the same household at the time of the child's birth or adoption  
by the child's parent; 
(ii) Has taken on full and permanent responsibilities as the child's parent; and 
(iii) Has held himself or herself out as the child's parent with the agreement of the child's 
parent or, if there are 2 parents, both parents; or 
(B) Who: 
(i) Has lived with the child in the same household for at least 10 of the 12 months 
immediately preceding the filing of the complaint or motion for custody; 
(ii) Has formed a strong emotional bond with the child with the encouragement and 
intent of the child's parent that a parent-child relationship form between the child and the 
third party; 
(iii) Has taken on full and permanent responsibilities as the child's parent; and 
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parent by estoppel given in Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution.164 
Model acts, including the revised 2002 UPA165 and the American Bar 
Association Model Act Governing Assisted Reproductive Technologies,166 
addressed parentage of children conceived through assisted reproductive 
technologies. Four jurisdictions, the District of Columbia, Nevada, New 
Mexico, and Washington, passed gender-neutral and marital status–neutral 
statutes creating parentage in an individual who consents to a woman’s 
insemination with donor semen with the intent to be a parent of the child so 
conceived.167 These statutes are the logical outgrowth of the 1973 UPA. What 
applied only to married couples in 1973 needed to expand to the unmarried 
different-sex couples and same-sex couples that were not on the radar screen at 
that time. 
At the same time that common-law theories and newly enacted statutes 
were altering the legal-parentage landscape, a remarkable evolution occurred in 
the definition of the term neither Mnookin nor the 1973 UPA had thought to 
define: natural parent.168 It happened first in In re Nicholas H.,169 a California 
case involving a heterosexual couple. 
The original UPA, as adopted in California, created a presumption of 
parentage for a man who received a child into his home and openly held the 
child out as his natural child.170 It was a presumption, like all the UPA paternity 
presumptions, that could be rebutted.171 Although the term natural child was 
undefined, the common assumption that it meant biological child was consistent 
with references going back to Blackstone.172 
 
(iv) Has held himself or herself out as the child's parent with the agreement of the child's 
parent, or if there are 2 parents, both parents. 
D.C. CODE 16-831.01(1) (2013). A person who proves the above by clear and convincing evidence is a 
parent for purposes of determining custody, visitation, and child support. D.C. CODE 16-831.03(b) 
(2013).  
 164.  PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 
2.03(1)(b) (2002). 
 165.  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 4 (Supp. 2010). 
 166.  MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. §§ 601–607 (2008).  
 167.  D.C. CODE § 16-909(e) (2013); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11A-703 (2012); WASH. REV. CODE § 
26.26.710 (2005). In addition, an Oregon appeals court ruled, on a constitutional equal-protection 
theory, that the state’s statute creating parentage for a husband consenting to his wife’s insemination 
must apply equally to a woman who consents to her partner’s insemination with the intent to be a 
parent of the resulting child. Shineovich v. Kemp, 214 P.3d 29, 39–40 (Or. Ct. App. 2009).  
 168.  See generally UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (1973) § 1, 9B U.L.A. 296 (1987) (defining “parent and 
child relationship” but not “natural parent,” a term used in the definition of “parent and child 
relationship”); Mnookin, supra note 1 (also omitting a definition of “natural parent”). 
 169.  46 P.3d 932, 935 (Cal. 2002); see infra text accompanying notes 173–190.  
 170.  See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611(d) (West 2013) (“A man is presumed to be the natural father of a 
child if . . . [h]e receives the child into his home and openly holds out the child as his natural child.”).  
 171.  See id. § 7612 (exploring the ways to rebut the paternal presumption).  
 172.  Historically and at common law, blood relation was the primary means of establishing the legal 
status of a natural parent. Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760, 762 (Ohio C.P. Summit County 1994) (citing 
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *434. The first adoption statute in the United States was 
enacted in 1851 in Massachusetts. 1851 Mass. Acts 815. It stripped the “natural parent or parents” of all 
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In In re Nicholas H., Thomas and Kimberly met when Kimberly was already 
pregnant.173 Both decided that they wanted Thomas to be the child’s father, and, 
when Nicholas was born in 1995, Thomas’s name was placed on the birth 
certificate as the father’s.174 The couple never married, but they lived together 
with Nicholas intermittently, and Thomas consistently functioned as a father to 
Nicholas.175 The relationship between Thomas and Kimberly ended in 
September of 1999, resulting in Thomas moving out, and Kimberly being unable 
to properly supervise and protect Nicholas.176 In early 2000, Thomas filed a 
petition to establish a parental relationship with Nicholas and to receive 
temporary custody, alleging, among other things, that Kimberly was in jail for 
assaulting him.177 
Kimberly subsequently went to the police to report that Thomas had taken 
Nicholas without her permission, and she showed them a copy of a 1998 
restraining order against Thomas.178 Eventually, the police took Nicholas into 
custody, and dependency proceedings were instituted.179 The juvenile court 
found that Nicholas could not remain with Kimberly as a result of her 
instability, drug use, homelessness, lack of employment, and violence.180 
Although acknowledging that Thomas had problems, the court found that he 
was caring and responsible toward Nicholas and that Nicholas loved him and 
wanted to live with him.181 The court also found that the presumption that 
Thomas was Nicholas’s father was not rebutted.182 
The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Thomas’s admission that he 
was not Nicholas’s biological father rebutted the parentage presumption.183 That 
court reviewed numerous decisions that assumed the term “natural” meant 
“biological.”184 
The California Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, reversed the 
appeals court.185 It cited statutory language that a parentage presumption “may 
be rebutted in an appropriate action.”186 This, the court said, made rebutting the 
 
legal rights to the child. Id. § 7, at 816. Once again, the term “natural parent” was not defined, but the 
statute did confer “all other legal consequences and incidents of the natural relation of parents and 
children, the same to all intents and purposes as if such child had been born in lawful wedlock of such 
parents or parent by adoption” to the adoptive parents. Id. § 6. 
 173.  In re Nicholas H., 46 P.3d at 935. 
 174.  Id. 
 175.  Id. 
 176.  Id. at 934. 
 177.  Id. at 935. 
 178.  Id. at 934. 
 179.  Id. 
 180.  Id. at 935. 
 181.  Id. at 936. 
 182.  Id. at 934. 
 183.  Id. at 936. 
 184.  Id. (noting that the court of appeals reviewed family-law decisions that “assumed that natural 
means biological”).  
 185.  Id. at 941. 
 186.  Id. at 936. 
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presumption based on lack of biological connection discretionary, not 
mandatory.187 The court also quoted the portion of the statute asserting that if 
there were two or more conflicting presumptions, “the presumption which on 
the facts is founded on weightier considerations of policy and logic controls.”188 
If the legislature intended the presumption of paternity to be inapplicable to a 
man who is not a biological father, the court reasoned, it would not have 
provided for such weighing.189 Neither would the legislature have intended that 
an appropriate action for rebutting the presumption would be one that would 
leave the child with no father.190 Thus “natural father” and “natural child” did 
not, in fact, require a biological connection. 
California had also enacted another provision of the 1973 UPA, stating that 
the rules for determining paternity apply to determinations of maternity 
“[i]nsofar as practicable.”191 Almost immediately after Nicholas H., a California 
appeals court had occasion to consider the meaning of that provision. In In re 
Karen C.,192 a birth mother who bore a child in a hospital purposefully 
misidentified herself as another woman—Letitia C.—so that Letitia’s name 
would appear on the child’s birth certificate and Letitia would therefore be able 
to raise the child (the Karen in the case).193 Letitia raised Karen as her own child 
and told Karen she was adopted.194 
When Karen was ten years old she came into the dependency system as a 
result of allegations of abuse by Letitia.195 Karen and Letitia joined in a motion 
for a determination that Letitia was Karen’s mother, a finding that would 
ensure that Letitia receive services that could lead to her reunification with 
Karen.196 They argued that the fact that Letitia had received Karen into her 
home and held Karen out as her natural child, coupled with the provision 
applying father–child provisions to maternity actions, made Letitia a 
presumptive parent.197 The trial court denied the motion, but the appeals court 
reversed and remanded in light of the California Supreme Court’s ruling in 
Nicholas H.198 Because Nicholas H. held that “a man does not lose his status as a 
presumed father by admitting he is not the biological father,” the court held 
that Letitia also did not lose that status.199 On remand, the trial court would 
need to determine whether, in the circumstances of the case, it was appropriate 
 
 187.  Id. 
 188.  Id. at 937 (quoting CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612 (West 2013)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 189.  Id. 
 190.  Id. at 940.  
 191.  See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7650(a) (West 2013).  
 192.  124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 677 (Ct. App. 2002). 
 193.  Id. at 678. 
 194.  Id. 
 195.  Id. 
 196.  See id.  
 197.  Id. 
 198.  Id. at 677 (citing In re Nicholas H., 46 P.3d 932, 938 (Cal. 2002)). 
 199.  Id. at 681 (citing In re Nicholas H., 46 P.3d at 938). 
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to rebut the presumption.200 
Just a year later, a California appeals court squarely applied the father–child 
holding-out presumption to a determination of maternity. In re Salvador M.201 
considered the relationship between a child and his adult half sister, Monica. 
When Salvador was born, Monica had a baby of her own, and she breast fed 
Salvador when their (common) mother was unable.202 When Salvador was three, 
his mother died, and Monica continued to raise him as her son, along with yet 
another child she gave birth to.203 
When all three children came into California’s dependency system, Monica 
filed a petition to determine her maternity of Salvador.204 The social worker 
reported that Salvador believed Monica was his mother.205 Monica presented 
the following facts: 
Our mother died at the scene of an explosive car crash when Salvador was three. I 
have continued to care for Salvador as my child. He thinks of me as his mother and I 
think of him as my son. Our family knows of the actual relationship between Salvador 
and me and I have been truthful in official matters such as school registration, but to 
the rest of the world, Salvador is my son.
206
 
She argued that the holding-out provision of the California UPA, coupled 
with the provision for establishing maternity on the same bases as paternity, 
made her Salvador’s presumptive parent.207 The court agreed, citing In re Karen 
C..208 Then she cited Nicholas H. for the proposition that the fact that she was 
not Salvador’s genetic parent did not automatically rebut that presumption.209 
The court again agreed, and it further declared that it would not be appropriate 
to rebut the presumption because “to sever this deeply rooted mother/child 
bond would contravene the state’s interest in maintaining the family 
relationship.”210 
With these three cases as precedent, in 2005 the California Supreme Court, 
in Elisa B. v. Superior Court,211 extended the presumption of parentage to a 
lesbian who had received two children born to her female partner into her 
home and held the children out as her natural children.212 Nicholas H. had held 
that biology did not automatically rebut a presumption based on the holding-
 
 200.  Id. at 682. 
 201.  4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 705 (Ct. App. 2003). 
 202.  Id. at 706. 
 203.  Id. 
 204.  Id. at 707. 
 205.  Id. 
 206.  Id. at 707. 
 207.  Id. at 707–08 (citing CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611 (West 2013); In re Karen C., 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
677, 677 (Ct. App. 2002)). 
 208.  Id. at 708 (citing In re Karen C., 124 Cal. Rptr. at 677).  
 209.  Id. 
 210.  Id. at 709. 
 211.  117 P.3d 660 (Cal. 2005).  
 212.  Id. at 662. 
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out provision of the UPA.213 Karen C. had held the presumption applicable to 
determinations of the mother–child relationship.214 The court found the facts of 
this case did not present an “appropriate action” upon which to rebut Elisa’s 
presumed parentage because she “actively consented to, and participated in, the 
artificial insemination of her partner with the understanding that the resulting 
child or children would be raised by Emily and her as coparents, and they did 
act as coparents for a substantial period of time.”215 In addition, rebutting the 
presumption would leave the children with only one parent “as a source of both 
emotional and financial support.”216 
More than fifteen years after the California courts had begun considering 
(eventually rejecting) Michele G.’s claim that she was the parent of the two 
children she raised with her former partner, it turned out that the theory 
supporting her parentage had been, the entire time, hiding in plain sight.217 The 
relevant statutes had not changed. But in 1991 it had been “undisputed,” even 
by the most creative and determined advocates for LGBT families, that Michele 
G. was not the “natural mother” of her children.218 
Courts in Colorado,219 New Mexico,220 and, most recently, Kansas,221 have 
found in the context of disputes by former lesbian partners that under each 
state’s UPA both women are mothers of the children they planned for and 
raised together. The Kansas ruling is especially significant. Kansas offers no 
relationship recognition for same-sex couples; it does not prohibit employment 
and other discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation; it has not granted 
second-parent adoptions.222 In other words, it is not a state with a favorable 
 
 213.  Id. at 667. 
 214.  Id.  
 215.  Id. at 670, 669.  
 216.  Id. at 669. 
 217.  See Nancy S. v. Michele G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212, 215 (Ct. App. 1991). Courts have used this 
analysis to confer parentage on both mothers in numerous California cases. See In re Domestic 
Partnership of C.P. and D.F., No. E052672, 2013 WL 2099156 (Cal. Ct. App. May 16, 2013); Beth C. v. 
Marcia B., No. B233825, 2013 WL 143543 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 14, 2013); L.M. v. M.G., 145 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
97 (Ct. App. 2012); E.C. v. J.V., 136 Cal. Rptr. 3d 339 (Ct. App. 2012); Charisma R. v. Christian S., 44 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 332 (Ct. App. 2006).  
 218.  See Nancy S., 279 Cal. Rptr. at 215. It was a Boulder, Colorado attorney, Barbara Lavender, 
who in the late 1990s first successfully used these provisions of the UPA to obtain parentage for both 
women in a lesbian couple bearing a child through donor insemination. The clients she represented 
obtained parentage judgments from a trial judge which resulted in a new birth certificate listing both 
women as parents. For an article describing Lavender’s success, see Pam Regsenberg, Gay Groups 
Cheer Ruling, BOULDER DAILY CAMERA, Sept. 8, 2000, available at http://www.barbaralavender.com/ 
articles_gaygroupscheer.htm. 
 219.  The Colorado ruling came at the trial level. See Colleen Curry, Colorado Lesbian Wendy 
Alfredson Mom Granted Paternity in Custody Battle, ABC NEWS (May 4, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/ 
US/colorado-lesbian-mom-wendy-alfredsen-granted-paternity-custody/story?id=16280117. Precedent 
for that ruling was an appellate case finding parentage for the nonbiological mother married to a child’s 
biological father. See In re S.N.V., 284 P.3d 147, 148 (Colo. App. 2011).  
 220.  Chatterjee v. King, 280 P.3d 283, 285 (N.M. 2012).  
 221.  Frazier v. Goudschaal, 295 P.3d 542, 558 (Kan. 2013).  
 222.  See State Profile – Kansas, MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, http://www.lgbtmap.org/ 
equality-maps/profile_state/KS (last updated May 15, 2014). 
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climate for LGBT families. Nonetheless, it has parentage statutes that allowed a 
unanimous three-judge panel of its Supreme Court to find the standards for 
determining paternity applicable to determinations of maternity.223 As a result, 
children raised by same-sex couples in Kansas are not going to lose one of their 
parents if those parents split up. 
A handful of other states have legal authorities that support identical 
reasoning.224 The necessary components for success under this theory are (1) a 
statutory presumption of paternity based on holding a child out as one’s own, 
(2) case law that lack of genetic connection to the child does not automatically 
rebut that presumption, and (3) statutory direction to apply the rules for 
determining paternity to determinations of maternity. Those three components 
mean that a woman who meets the holding-out requirement is a presumed 
mother and her lack of genetic connection to the child does not rebut that. 
Alabama is an example of a state with these necessary components. Like 
Kansas, Alabama provides no recognition of same-sex couples and no 
protection against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.225 In 
addition, it has a series of court rulings denying custody to a lesbian mother 
when challenged by a former husband.226 Nonetheless, it should find that both 
women who plan for and raise a child together are parents of that child. 
Under Alabama law, a man is presumed a child’s father if he “receives the 
child into his home and openly holds out the child as his natural child or 
otherwise openly holds out the child as his natural child and establishes a 
significant parental relationship with the child by providing emotional and 
financial support.”227 The Code also states that “[p]rovisions of this chapter 
relating to determinations of paternity apply to determinations of maternity.”228 
And just last year the Alabama Supreme Court provided strong support for the 
holding-out presumption and ruled that a man’s lack of genetic connection to a 
child is not a basis for rebutting that presumption.229 
 
 
 
 223.  Frazier, 295 P.3d at 553. 
 224.  Some states have enacted the 2002 UPA rather than the 1973 UPA. The 2002 UPA, without 
changing substance, rephrases the language on applying paternity presumptions to determinations of 
maternity as follows: “Provisions of this [Act] relating to determination of paternity apply to 
determinations of maternity.” UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 106 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 19–20 (Supp. 
2010) (alterations in original). The holding-out provision has been substantively changed to apply only 
where the parent and child have lived together for child’s first two years. Specifically, a man is 
presumed to be a child’s father if “for the first two years of the child’s life, he resided in the same 
household with the child and openly held out the child as his own.” Id. § 204(a)(5).  
 225. See State Profile – Alabama, MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, http://www.lgbtmap.org/ 
equality-maps/profile_state/AL (last updated May 15, 2014). 
 226.  See, e.g., Ex parte J.B.F., 730 So. 2d 1190, 1191 (Ala. 1998); L.A.M. v. B.M., 906 So. 2d 942, 947 
(Ala. Civ. App. 2004).  
 227.  ALA. CODE § 26-17-204(a)(5) (2009).  
 228.  Id. § 26-17-106. 
 229.  Ex parte T.J., 89 So. 3d 774, 748 (Ala. 2012).   
7_POLIKOFF_EIC (DO NOT DELETE) 8/8/2014  10:40 AM 
218 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 77:195 
In Ex parte T.J., a maternal grandmother filed a petition for custody of three 
grandchildren.230 The following month, T.J. filed a petition for custody of one of 
the children, alleging that the child had lived with him since her birth and that 
he was her father.231 Subsequently, the mother filed both a custody petition and 
a motion for genetic testing.232 She submitted evidence that T.J. was 
incarcerated when she became pregnant and that she was five-months pregnant 
was he was released from prison.233 
The trial court found that T.J. had established a parent–child relationship 
with the child, that the child called T.J. “daddy,” that the mother allowed that 
relationship to grow, and that T.J. had provided for the child emotionally and 
financially.234 Nonetheless, the judge granted the mother’s motion for genetic 
testing, and T.J. sought a writ of mandamus to vacate the order.235 
In reasoning similar to that in Nicholas H., the Alabama Supreme Court 
sided with T.J. T.J. was entitled to submit evidence that he was the child’s 
presumed father under the holding-out provision.236 The statute provided that 
when there were two or more presumptions, the one “founded on the weightier 
considerations of public policy and logic . . . shall control.”237 The legislature 
would not have adopted such a provision, the court ruled, if only a biological 
father could be a presumed father.238 The court continued that “biological ties 
are not as important as parent-child relationships that give young children 
emotional stability.”239 It cited a 1989 case denying an alleged biological father 
the right to challenge the presumption of paternity accorded the husband of the 
child’s mother. 240 Although that case involved the marital presumption, Ex 
parte T.J. explicitly extended the same principle to a man presumed to be the 
father under the holding-out provision.241 
The court further cited with approval the reasoning of the dissenting judge 
in the lower appellate court. That judge determined that the paternity 
presumption applied to 
a man who openly treats a child in the same manner he would treat his biological 
child, who openly treats a child in accordance with the way that a father would treat 
 
 230.  Id. at 745. 
 231.  Id. 
 232.  Id. 
 233.  Id. at 746. 
 234.  Id. at 750–51 (Murdock, J., dissenting). 
 235.  Id. at 746 (majority opinion). 
 236.  Id. at 747. 
 237.  Id. (quoting ALA. CODE § 26-17-204(b) (2009)). 
 238.  Id. 
 239.  Id. 
 240.  Id. (citing Ex Parte Presse, 554 So. 2d 406 (Ala. 1989)). The constitutionality of a California 
statute that denied a biological father the ability to file a parentage action concerning a child born to a 
woman who was married to another man at the time of the child’s conception and birth, when the 
woman and her husband wished to raise the child as their own, was upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court 
in a plurality opinion in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989). 
 241.  Ex parte T.J., 89 So. 3d at 748.  
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his biological child, or who openly treats the child as if the child had assumed the role 
of his biological child ‘and establishes a significant parental relationship with the child 
by providing emotional and financial support for the child.’
242
 
“Read in this way,” that judge continued, “[the statute] serves to promote a 
significant parental relationship over a mere biological connection.”243 Because 
of the provision applying rules for paternity determinations to determinations 
of maternity, biology is therefore not a necessary component for determining 
that a woman is a child’s mother. 
C. Troxel Does Not Bar the Finding that a Child Has Two Mothers 
In every instance where a court has found a legal basis to rule that both 
women are the parents of the children, the court has simultaneously rebuffed an 
argument that Troxel insulates the biological or adoptive mother from a 
challenge by her former partner.244 Rather, every court has ruled that Troxel 
extends constitutional protection to both women, because both are the child’s 
parents. For example, in Smith v. Guest,245 the Delaware Supreme Court upheld 
the constitutionality of a statute defining parentage to include a de facto parent 
meeting specific criteria: 
The issue here is not whether the Family Court has infringed Smith’s fundamental 
parental right to control who has access to ANS by awarding Guest co-equal parental 
status. Rather, the issue is whether Guest is a legal “parent” of ANS who would also 
have parental rights to ANS—rights that are co-equal to Smith’s. This is not a case, 
like Troxel, where a third party having no claim to a parent-child relationship (e.g., the 
child’s grandparents) seeks visitation rights . . . . Because Guest, as a legal parent, 
would have a co-equal “fundamental parental interest” in raising ANS, allowing Guest 
to pursue that interest through a legally-recognized channel cannot unconstitutionally 
infringe Smith’s due-process rights.
246
 
V 
CONCLUSION: FINAL THOUGHTS ON THE APPLICABILITY OF MNOOKIN’S 
PRINCIPLES 
Mnookin valued family autonomy and continuity and stability in 
relationships.247 Judges who have used family-autonomy arguments to rule 
against nonbiological and nonadoptive parents have misidentified the family 
before them. The family is the one created by the biological or adoptive parent 
and her partner. Valuing family autonomy means taking that family as it is and 
making appropriate decisions in the interests of the children. It violates the 
principle of family autonomy to reconfigure a family with two parents raising 
 
 242.  Id. at 748–49. 
 243.  Id. 
 244. See, e.g., Charisma R. v. Kristina S., 96 Cal. Rptr. 3d 26, 49–52 (Ct. App. 2009) (finding an 
analogy to Troxel “inapposite” because of the different interests asserted by the plaintiff in the 
immediate case); In re L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 177 (Wash. 2005) (en banc) (rejecting the suggestion that 
granting de facto–parent status violated the biological mother’s constitutional rights). 
 245.  16 A.3d 920, 924 (Del. 2011). 
 246.  Id. at 931. 
 247.  Mnookin, supra note 1, at 264–65.  
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children into a single-parent family with a live-in third party. As discussed in 
this article, numerous courts have recognized this. 
The importance of stability and continuity is precisely the principle that 
demands that the law recognize the reality of the child’s perspective on his or 
her family. In 1975, the Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit articulation of 
psychological parentage was relatively new.248 Today it is a widely understood 
concept. Mnookin supported the best-interests standard “between two natural 
parents, neither of whom would endanger a child’s physical health, where both 
are psychological parents.”249 He continued that “I do not think that existing 
psychological theories provide the basis to choose generally between two adults 
where the child has some relationship and psychological attachment to each.”250 
The families I describe in this article contain one or more children who 
regard the couple raising them as their parents, and specifically their 
psychological parents. Several courts have identified both adults as parents, 
through common-law adjudication, constitutional analysis, or recognition that 
the term “natural parent” in a statute is not limited to biological parents, 
something with which I hope Mnookin would agree today.251 Other states have 
implemented statutory reforms that achieve the same result. The postseparation 
custody arrangements for such children should be decided using best-interests 
principles.252 
 
 
 248.  See GOLDSTEIN, FREUD & SOLNIT, supra note 6, at 17–20.   
 249.  Mnookin, supra note 1, at 283.  
 250.  Id. at 286–87. 
 251.  See Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of 
Indeterminacy, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2014 at 249, 264–66. 
 252.  Because I argue here that the children in the factual scenarios in this article have two parents, I 
leave for another day other critical questions arising from modern family structures, including whether 
a child may have more than two parents and when someone who is not a parent, in other words a true 
third party, should have the ability to demand court-ordered contact with a child. For an early germinal 
work on the latter subject, see Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The 
Need for Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 879 
(1984). That article could properly be the subject of its own thirty-years-later symposium. 
